Intuitively, we tend to believe that people can only be held morally responsible for actions that are within their control. However, in the late 1970s, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel challenged this assumption by observing that, in practice, we often make moral judgments about actions heavily influenced by luck. They termed this phenomenon moral luck (ML). 

Critics of ML typically adopt neo-Kantian perspectives, arguing that events beyond an agent’s control should not be subject to moral praise or blame. In contrast, defenders of ML often draw from neo-Aristotelian thought, emphasizing that external circumstances can significantly affect human flourishing. 

Linda Zagzebski extends the problem into a religious context, framing it as religious luck. She explores its implications for Christianity and points out that the problem becomes even more troubling when eternal salvation or damnation are at stake. A complete rejection of ML would lead to heresy, as it would imply that divine assistance is unnecessary for achieving perfect happiness.  Conversely, fully embracing ML would undermine the concept of free will—the foundation of moral responsibility. 

This paper aims to explore the refutation of ML in the case of Piccarda Donati (a character who broke a monastic vow, but not by her own fault) in Dante’s Divine Comedy. This is done by referring to the possibility of martyrdom and the moral significance of intention. In the context of the ML debate, Dante’s approach is distinctive due to the fact that the question of salvation or damnation in the Divine Comedy is inseparable from the moral evaluation of a single act.