In ordinary life and ethics, the following understanding is common: actions are right or wrong and should not be done if wrong. When we say that rape, torture, or murder are wrong, we understand that they should never be done. While these are serious cases, we extend this understanding to milder cases. When we say that lying, stealing, or bullying are wrong, we think that these things should not be done. Further, it is normal to assign praise and blame to the doing of right and wrong actions, respectively. I call this the standard deontic picture.

But there are some actions where we don’t apply this standard picture; instead, after calling some actions wrong, we merely hope that they might be done less. Two examples are the environment and animals. It is common to conclude that harming the environment is wrong; therefore, we ought to harm it less, e.g., by using fewer plastic bags. It is also common to conclude that harming animals is wrong; therefore, we ought to harm fewer animals, e.g., by eating meat only sometimes. Further, we assign praise to abstaining or doing less here.

Only a few philosophers, e.g., Thomas Hurka, Martin Peterson, and Campbell Brown, have translated the informal understanding into some concrete theory, as ethical gradualism. Here, I wish to focus on just one of the many questions that arise from acknowledging this perspective: when do we engage in gradualist thinking, and why?

My hypothesis and provisional conclusion are that we engage in gradualist thinking when an action is a member of a class, and that class of actions is otherwise condoned by our society.