With the rise of internet usage and digital transformation, we are assigned a new set of ethical dilemmas to help effectively navigate the online sphere; one out of many includes the ethics of online public shaming. Current philosophical literature addresses this debate well, with proponents roughly arguing for the ways in which online public shaming can instill desired behavior and values into the online community, while opponents question if this means to good behavior is reasonable, proportionate, or even ethical. Although debates on online public shaming may prove relatively new, philosophical debates on shaming trace back centuries, starting with Plato and Aristotle, who fairly similarly weigh the benefits and drawbacks of such a punitive measure. While my dissertation acknowledges this foundational existing debate on “whether to publicly shame online or not,” the main thesis goes beyond that, instead offering two original points of contemplation. The first is understanding shame as an evolved behavioral mechanism rooted in human social interactions, emotional regulation, and survival. The second is the analysis of a significant moral shift in online public shaming. That is to say, when compared to other (past, private, offline) shamings, those subject to online public shaming have been stripped of their moral responsibility. Moral responsibility now instead falls on the online community to express their dissent in an attempt to establish and perform their own moral character. Understanding this shift of moral responsibility may ultimately (and hopefully) influence further contemplations on the usefulness, ethics, or purposes of online public shaming in shaping today’s digital moral landscape.